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This paper presents new evidence on the patterns of price and wage adjustment in European firms and on the extent of 
nominal rigidities. It uses a unique dataset collected through a firm-level survey conducted in a broad range of countries 
and covering various sectors. Several conclusions are drawn from this evidence. Firms adjust wages less frequently than 
prices: the former tend to remain unchanged for about 15 months on average, the latter for around 10 months. The degree 
of price rigidity varies substantially across sectors and depends strongly on economic features, such as the intensity of 
competition, the exposure to foreign markets and the share of labour costs in total cost. Instead, country specificities, 
mostly related to the labour market institutional setting, are more relevant in characterising the pattern of wage 
adjustment. The latter exhibits also a substantial degree of time-dependence, as firms tend to concentrate wage changes 
in a specific month, mostly January in the majority of countries. Wage and price changes feed into each other at the micro 
level and there is a relationship between wage and price rigidity.
Keywords: survey, wage rigidity, price rigidity, indexation, institutions, time dependent.
JEL: D21, E30, J31.
A tanulmány az európai vállalatok ár- és béralkalmazkodási gyakorlatáról, valamint a nominális merevségek mértékéről 
ismertet új tényeket. A tanulmány egyedi adatbázist használ, amely egy számos országban lekérdezett és különböző ter-
melési szektort lefedő vállalati kérdőíven alapul. Az adatok alapján több következtetés is levonható. A vállalatok ritkábban 
változtatnak béreiken, mint áraikon: az előbbiek átlagosan 15 hónapig, míg az utóbbiak körülbelül 10 hónapig maradnak 
változatlanok. Az árak merevségének mértéke jelentősen eltér a szektorok között, és nagyban függ olyan közgazdasági 
tényezőktől, mint a verseny erőssége, a külföldi piacoknak való kitettség, valamint a munkaerő költségének teljes költsé-
gen belüli hányada. Ezzel szemben a bérek alkalmazkodási mechanizmusa országfüggő, és főként a munkapiaci intézmé-
nyek befolyásolják. A bérmeghatározásra szintén jellemző a dátumhoz kötöttség, mivel a vállalatok zömmel egy adott 
hónapban változtatják béreiket, az országok többségében januárban. Az ár- és bérváltozások kölcsönösen hatnak egymás-
ra mikro szinten, és az ár- és bérmerevségek között is kapcsolat van.
Abstract
Összefoglaló
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This paper studies the frequency, timing and interaction of wage and price changes across firms, covering several economic 
sectors and a broad range of European countries. It provides new micro-founded evidence for models of wage and price 
staggering that have become very popular in New Keynesian DSGE models. The important role of labour markets in 
generating price rigidity in structural models is discussed for instance in Altissimo et al. (2006). By incorporating real 
wage rigidities, i.e. the slow adjustment of real wages to underlying market conditions, in the framework of a New 
Keynesian Philips Curve, these models seem to fit better the data. Approaching the analysis of price and wage dynamics 
simultaneously can also shed light on the impact of recent changes in labour market institutions on wage and labour cost 
dynamics. For example, it can provide useful insights on the sources behind the substantial degree of wage moderation 
observed in a number of European countries, which in turn could be potentially useful in terms of implications for monetary 
policy and structural reform.
This paper uses a new and unique cross-country dataset − unprecedented by international standards in terms of both 
geographical and sectoral coverage − based on an ad-hoc survey on wage and pricing policies at the firm level. The survey 
was developed within the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), a research network grouping 23 central banks in the EU and 
coordinated by the European Central Bank. It was carried out by 17 national central banks (12 of which belonging to the 
euro area and 5 new EU member states) between the end of 2007 and the first half of 2008, on the basis of a harmonised 
questionnaire that aimed at uncovering specific features of firm’s price and wage setting policies and their relationships. 
Overall, more than 17,000 firms were interviewed, belonging to different size classes and operating in different sectors of 
the economy. The uniqueness of this survey is at least twofold. First, its country coverage: given the large heterogeneity of 
labour markets across European countries, the harmonised questionnaire allows to widen our understanding of the effects 
of different labour market institutions and policies in price and wage setting practices. Second, the scope and richness of 
the information collected. In addition to collecting information on both price and wage setting and adjustments, the survey 
collects information on firm’s characteristics such as the sector of activity, its size, the structure of the product market in 
which it operates, the intensity of competitive pressures on this market, the structure of its labour force and institutional 
features potentially affecting its wage and labour policies. 
The use of surveys to investigate pricing policies was pioneered by the seminal work of Blinder (1991) and Blinder et al. 
(1998) and led to similar analyses in other countries as well as in the euro area, in the context of a previous research 
network grouping central banks of the Eurosystem, the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN; for the results, see Fabiani et 
al., 2007). The survey on which this paper is based can be regarded as the “natural” follow-up to some of the evidence on 
price behaviour revealed by the IPN (Altissimo et al., 2006; Fabiani et al., 2007). Indeed one of the most interesting finding 
of studies based on micro quantitative and survey data (see Álvarez et al., 2006; Dhyne et al., 2007; Vermeulen, et al., 
2007; Fabiani et al., 2006) is the substantial heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness across products and sectors, 
related among many other factors to the variability of input costs and the cost structure at the firm and sectoral level. This 
evidence, albeit anecdotic, raises the question of whether the observed dispersion in the frequency of price changes is the 
result of wage inertial behaviour, placing firms’ wage setting policies at the heart of our research interests.
In the existing literature, surveys focused on wage setting at the firm level are mostly aimed at disentangling the existence 
and the reasons of downward wage rigidity; seminal works in this field are those by Blinder (1991), Agell and Lundborg 
(2003), Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Franz and Pfeiffer (2006). This paper enriches this line of research by exploring 
other dimensions of wage setting, focusing explicitly on how firms set and adjust prices and wages and on the relationship 
introduction
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between wage and pricing policies and adjustments.1 In particular, it aims at providing answers to the following questions: 
(i) How often are prices and base wages changed in Europe? Are adjustments synchronized or not and do they tend to take 
place in specific months of the year? (ii) Are there significant differences across firms, sectors and countries regarding the 
frequency and timing of wage and price changes and their relationship? If such differences are indeed present, how do they 
eventually relate to institutional and structural features such as the nature of wage negotiations, the presence of forms of 
indexation of wages to prices, the intensity of competitive pressures, the structure of the workforce, or the labour intensity 
of production as suggested by the IPN results?
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 1 briefly presents the WDN survey and the data collected. Section 2 
focuses on descriptive evidence on the frequency and timing of price and wage changes at the firm level, their relationship 
and the variation across countries and sectors. Section 3 investigates, within a multivariate econometric analysis, the role 
of various explanatory factors of price and wage changes at the firm level. Section 4 summarizes the main findings.
1  Other studies produced in the context of the WDN investigate different dimensions of the survey. Babecký et al. (2008) focus on nominal and real 
wage rigidity by examining not only the issue of flexibility in base wages but also alternative margins of labour costs adjustment at the firm level. 
Bertola et al. (2008) analyse firms’ dominant adjustment strategies in reaction to unanticipated changes in demand, costs and wages and investigate 
some possible determinants underlying this choice. Galuscak et al. (2008) deal with the issue of wages of newly hired workers and investigate the 
relative importance of internal, external and institutional factors in this particular market.
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The data used for this paper is a subset of the dataset collected by the WDN survey. It concentrates on 15 countries for which 
fully harmonised data are available; namely: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. Although the national surveys were organized 
and carried out by each national central bank, the questionnaire and the target population of firms were very similar 
across countries. A “core questionnaire” was developed in a co-coordinated fashion within the WDN and was adopted by 
all participant countries with at most minor modifications.2 Country-level micro data were pooled together into a common 
dataset. It covers firms employing more than 5 employees and operating in manufacturing, construction and services 
(trade, market services and financial intermediation).3
Sample size, sampling probabilities and non-response patterns vary across countries as well as across sectors and firms’ 
size within countries. In general, studies based on survey data need to handle this heterogeneity. We adopt employment-
adjusted weights, where the weight attached to each firm in the sample refers to how many employees that observation 
represents in the population.4
Tables 1 and 2 present the sample composition by country, sector and firm size. Table 2 also shows the distribution based 
on the number of employees represented by the sample. The total number of firms is just below 15,000, representing 
almost 48 million employees. By design, the sample is relatively balanced across firm size categories, and its sectoral 
distribution closely follows that of employment.
Table 1
Sample composition by country
country Number of firms %
AT 548 3.67
BE 1,420 9.5
CZ 399 2.67
EE 366 2.45
ES 1,769 11.84
FR 2,011 13.46
GR 401 2.68
HU 1,959 13.11
IE 848 5.68
IT 952 6.37
LT 333 2.23
NL 1,068 7.15
PL 896 6.0
PT 1,320 8.84
SI 650 4.35
Total 14,940 100
2 An exception is Germany, where the data collected are not fully comparable. This explains why Germany is not included in our sample.
3  See Appendix 1 for details on the survey and on national samples and Appendix 2 for the questionnaire. Questions labelled as “non-core” refer to 
those questions that countries had the option not to include in their national questionnaires.
4  The weights are defined as the sum of all employees in the population in a sampling category (by country, sector, firm size category, perhaps region) 
divided by the number of observations (firms) in that category. They can also be thought of as the product of three fractions: the intended sampling 
probability, the response rate, and employees per firm. They add up to total employment in the population the sample represents.
1  Data and sample
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Table 2
Sample composition by sector and size and the employment population represented
(a) Number of observations
5-19 20-49 50-199 >200 Total
Number of firms:
Manufacturing 887 1,271 2,267 1,778 6,203
Construction 378 312 337 114 1,141
Trade 1,189 737 793 362 3,081
Market services 1,350 1,060 1,045 726 4,181
Financial services 108 35 78 113 334
Total 3,912 3,415 4,520 3,093 14,940
Employees (thousands):
Manufacturing 2,209 4,202 5,124 7,793 193,28
Construction 832 605 657 341 2,435
Trade 2,928 2,496 1,971 2,405 9,800
Market services 2,545 2,638 3,056 6,797 1,5036
Financial services 162 86 255 531 1034
Total 8,677 10,026 11,063 17,67 47,633
(b) Percentages
5-19 20-49 50-199 >200 Total
Number of firms:
Manufacturing 5.9 8.5 15.2 11.9 41.5
Construction 2.5 2.1 2.3 0.8 7.6
Trade 8.0 4.9 5.3 2.4 20.6
Market services 9.0 7.1 7.0 4.9 28.0
Financial services 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.8 2.2
Total 26.2 22.9 30.3 20.7 100
Employees: 
Manufacturing 4.6 8.8 10.8 16.4 40.6
Construction 1.7 1.3 1.4 0.7 5.1
Trade 6.1 5.2 4.1 5.0 20.6
Market services 5.3 5.5 6.4 14.3 31.6
Financial services 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.1 2.2
Total 18.2 21.0 23.2 37.5 100
 
An advantage of this survey is that firms were directly asked about a number of features referring to the institutional setup 
within the firm or to the environment where it operates (e.g. the degree of competition or the existence of a policy at 
the firm level that adjusts wages to inflation). Information on these features is rarely available in administrative and other 
datasets. On the other hand, the survey suffers from several shortcomings inherent in ad hoc surveys, such as low rates 
of response and potential misunderstandings in interpreting the questions. Moreover, results may be influenced by the 
specific economic situation prevailing in each country at that time interviews were carried out (around the end of 2007 
and the beginning of 2008).
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The adjustment mechanism of prices and wages followed by firms plays a crucial role on the transmission of economic 
shocks. In particular, the degree of price and wage rigidity determines the speed of adjustment of the economy and the 
amount of the related costs. A deep understanding of the extent and sources of rigidity is therefore of major importance 
for assessing the effects of monetary policy and calibrating macroeconomic models for policy analysis.
Despite the relevance of the issue, available empirical evidence, comparable across countries and sectors, on the stickiness 
of wages is rather scarce. Concerning price adjustment, instead, studies conducted within the IPN revealed a somewhat 
high degree of stickiness in the euro area, as measured by the frequency of price changes, especially when compared to 
the United States. This finding was supported consistently by evidence based on both survey data (Fabiani et al., 2007) 
and quantitative micro consumer and producer price data (Dhyne et al., 2007; Vermeulen et al., 2007). Another important 
and robust result of these studies was the substantial heterogeneity of the frequency of price changes across products and 
sectors, which appears to be related, among other factors, to the variability in the cost structure at the firm and sectoral 
level, in particular in the relative importance of labour costs.5
The information on price and wage adjustment collected by the WDN survey contributes to fill the gap related to the lack of 
data on wage policies at the firm level and to address the issue of the degree of price and wage stickiness simultaneously. 
In the rest of this section we present some descriptive evidence on three different aspects related to this issue: i) the 
frequency of wage and price changes; ii) the prevailing mechanism of adjustment (time vs. state dependence) and its 
timing; and iii) the extent to which wage changes feed into price changes and vice versa.
2.1  HOW OFTEN ARE PRicES AND WAGES ADJuSTED?
The frequency of price and wage changes provides a rough measure of the extent of nominal rigidities which are, among 
other things, an essential ingredient in the calibration of standard DSGE models with staggered adjustment mechanisms 
that are widely used for monetary policy analysis (see, among others, Woodford, 2003; Gali et al., 2003; Smets and 
Wouters, 2003). 
On this issue, the WDN survey explicitly asked firms about the frequency of price changes for their main product (see 
Appendix 2, question 31) and of wage changes for their main occupational group (question 9). In the former case, firms 
could choose between the following range of categories: daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, twice a year, once a year, 
less frequently than once a year, other. The frequency of wage adjustment was instead tackled through three separate 
questions capturing different types of wage changes: those due to factors unrelated to tenure and/or inflation, those due 
to tenure and those due to inflation. The exact wording of the question in each case is the following: “How frequently is 
the base wage of an employee belonging to the main occupational group in your firm typically changed?”. Respondents 
could choose from the options: more than once a year; once a year; once every two years; less frequently than once every 
two years; never/don’t know.
5  Consumer price data and survey results show that prices are changed least often in the services sector. Producer price data suggest that the frequency 
of price changes is highest for those products that have not undergone many transformations and, hence, whose costs are closely linked to the typically 
rather volatile raw material prices. A similar heterogeneity across sectors is found in the United States.
2  Price and wage adjustment: 
frequency, timing and interaction
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In the analysis of the answers concerning price setting, we aggregate the first three options, on the one hand, and the 
fourth and fifth, on the other, and end up with four categories: daily to monthly, quarterly to half-yearly, yearly and less 
frequent than yearly. As for wages, we aggregate the third and fourth categories into a single one, which we label as “less 
frequently than once a year”. In order to simplify the description of results, in the rest of this paper we consider a synthetic 
measure, defined as the highest frequency of firm-level wage change among the three types described above (due to 
factors unrelated to tenure and/or inflation, due to tenure; due to inflation).
Tables 3 and 4 show that in general price adjustments are more frequent than wage adjustments. About half of the firms 
change prices once a year or less frequently; a quarter do it more often, while the remaining ones do not report any 
particular pattern. Wages are changed less frequently: for 85 percent of firms once a year or less often, only for 12 percent 
more often.
The disaggregation by sector and country reveals a substantially higher dispersion in the frequency of price adjustment 
across sectors than across countries, whereas the opposite is true in the case of wage adjustment. Firms in manufacturing 
and market services adjust prices much less often that those in trade and financial services, while construction is the sector 
with the highest fraction of firms reporting no regular pattern in price revisions (Table 3).6 As regards wages, the cross-
sectoral variation is lower. Wage changes are least frequent in trade and business services, more frequent in manufacturing 
and most frequent in construction. Even in this latter sector, though, 60 percent of the firms report adjustments at the 
yearly frequency and only 22 percent at a higher frequency.7
When looking at differences across countries, the top panel of Table 4 shows that the variability in the frequency of price 
changes is lower than across sectors. Poland, Lithuania, Ireland and the Netherlands are the countries with the highest 
6  When interpreting the results concerning financial services, a note of caution regards, on the one hand, the concept of price, which might be difficult 
to capture for respondents, and, on the other, the fact that in most countries interviews were carried out in a period of exceptional turbulence on 
international financial markets.
7  A comparable analysis has been done by size classes, as defined in Section 1. Differences in frequencies of price and wage changes by firms’ size turn 
out to be negligible. 
More frequently than  
once a year
Yearly
Less frequently than once 
a year
Never/don’t know
Total 12.1 59.5 25.6 2.9
Manufacturing 12.3 59.1 26.5 2.1
Construction 21.5 59.9 15.6 3.0
Trade 10.8 58.3 27.3 3.6
Market services 10.9 60.7 24.9 3.5
Financial services 15.6 59.8 23.1 1.5
Standard deviation 4.5 0.9 4.7 0.9
Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses.
Table 3
Frequency of price and wage changes across sectors
(percentages)
PRicES
Daily to monthly
Quarterly to half 
yearly
Yearly
Less frequently than 
once a year
No pattern
Total 9.2 15.4 39.2 7.4 28.5
Manufacturing 5.3 16.1 43.4 7.8 27.3
Construction 7.6 20.4 29.5 7.2 35.2
Trade 22.9 20.3 27.4 3.2 26.1
Market services 5.4 10.4 44.3 9.8 29.9
Financial services 14.8 18.4 23.0 5.4 36.7
Standard deviation 7.6 4.1 9.7 2.5 4.7
WAGES (for any reason)
MAGyAR NEMZETI BANK
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WAGES (for any reason)
More frequently
than once a year
Yearly
Less frequently than once 
a year
Never/don’t know
Total 12.1 59.5 25.6 2.9
Euro area 11.4 59.5 26.4 2.7
Austria 6.8 84.2 5.9 3.1
Belgium 22.0 64.8 9.8 3.4
France 19.7 74.1 5.2 1.1
Greece 33.9 56.4 9.7 0.0
Ireland 14.6 71.2 9.9 4.3
Italy 4.2 26.9 64.6 4.3
Netherlands 10.8 70.1 17.0 2.1
Portugal 5.9 82.2 8.4 3.5
Slovenia 27.2 65.6 5.9 1.3
Spain 11.9 84.1 2.5 1.5
Non-Euro Area 14.0 59.5 23.2 3.3
Czech Republic 11.5 64.1 23.0 1.4
Estonia 19.9 64.4 10.5 5.2
Hungary 2.6 75.0 12.2 10.2
Lithuania 42.1 44.0 7.5 6.4
Poland 13.6 56.3 28.2 1.9
Standard deviation 11.2 15.4 15.4 2.6
Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. The split up between frequencies of wage changes has to be 
interpreted differently for Greece, as the options never/don’t know were not allowed in the Greek questionnaire.
Table 4
Frequency of price and wage changes across countries
(percentages)
PRicES
Daily to monthly
Quarterly to half 
yearly
Yearly
Less frequently than 
once a year
No pattern
Total 9.2 15.4 39.2 7.4 28.5
Euro area 9.0 12.9 40.8 5.1 32.1
Austria 11.6 13.2 37.3 4.9 32.9
Belgium 8.5 12.2 43.9 6.1 28.9
France 5.5 14.3 49.3 4.2 26.6
Greece 3.6 18.2 40.8 6.6 30.8
Ireland 14.8 15.4 33.6 6.7 29.1
Italy 8.9 12.9 32.3 6.5 39.3
Netherlands 12.7 16.0 44.4 5.6 21.4
Portugal 7.9 12.2 44.2 2.1 33.6
Slovenia 7.7 17.2 37.5 6.2 26.4
Spain 10.4 7.7 47.3 3.1 31.2
Non-Euro Area 9.9 22.5 35.0 13.6 18.6
Czech Republic 9.7 12.6 36.3 8.5 32.7
Estonia 5.1 18.4 32.5 8.8 34.7
Hungary 6.1 10.3 45.2 8.6 28.0
Lithuania 8.9 27.8 20.4 11.0 30.3
Poland 11.1 27.7 34.2 16.8 10.2
Standard deviation 3.0 5.7 7.5 3.5 6.7
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fraction of firms revising prices more than once a year, whereas Hungary, Spain and France are those with the lowest; for 
the whole euro area, this fraction is 22 percent, about ten percentage points lower than for the non-euro area aggregate.
Substantial cross-country variation is instead observed in the case of wages (bottom panel in Table 4). Lithuanian, Greek 
and Slovenian firms adjust base wages most frequently, followed by Belgium, France and Estonia, while Hungary, Italy and 
Portugal are the countries with the lowest fraction of firms changing wages more often than yearly. The modal frequency is 
one year in all countries except Italy and Lithuania. Despite the large differences across individual countries, the frequency 
distribution is broadly similar when one compares the euro-area and non-euro area aggregates.
Overall, the higher dispersion in the frequency of price adjustment across sectors than across countries suggests that 
product market characteristics (e.g. the degree of competition, the exposure to foreign competitive pressures, the cost 
structure, etc.) are important determinants of firms’ pricing behaviour and potential sources of the degree of price 
stickiness. Conversely, the strong heterogeneity across countries that emerges with regard to wage change frequencies is a 
sign that the institutional setting, in particular the bargaining mechanisms, their coverage and their degree of centralisation, 
may be important forces behind the rigidity of wages. For instance in Italy, though expected inflation is embedded in wage 
negotiations, the latter are mostly centralised and carried out every two years; hence, firms consistently report very rare 
infra-annual wage adjustments.
The evidence on the frequency of adjustment discussed so far can also be summarised through an alternative measure of 
nominal rigidity, i.e. the number of months for which prices and wages remain unchanged (“duration”). The computation 
of the duration indicator is still based on the answers concerning the frequency of price and wage changes but requires 
additional specific assumptions. In particular, whereas most of those answers directly translate into durations (e.g. “once 
a year” translates into a duration of 12 months), a few of them refer to intervals (e.g. “less frequently than once every 
two years”). In order to impute expected durations in these latter cases, we assume that the underlying distribution of 
durations is lognormal (with different moments for prices and wages), we estimate the parameters of the distributions from 
the other answers, and compute the conditional expectations for these categories. 
The results on duration should, therefore, be regarded as approximations, as the imputations are based on untestable 
distributional assumptions (see Appendix 3 for details). The impact of these assumptions on the estimates reported below 
is, however, quite negligible, as they concern only a minority of answers.8 Another important qualification is that price 
durations are not computed for around one-fourth of firms that report “no pattern” to the question on the frequency of 
price changes. A similar omission applies to wage changes, since wage durations are not computed for firms that report 
“never/don’t know” to the question on the frequency of wage changes; however, in this case it is much less relevant since 
it concerns only 3 percent of the firms.
Table 5 shows that wages in European firms remain unchanged, on average, longer than prices (15 months against around 
10). The estimate for prices is in line with the evidence emerged from the studies conducted within the IPN, which point to 
marginally longer durations: 11 months on the basis of survey data and around 13 months on the basis of micro-consumer 
price data. This slight difference might be related to both the fact that the sample of countries for which data are available 
is larger in the WDN survey and that the period in time to which data refer is different. 
Looking at sectoral differences, our results reveal that prices set by manufacturers and business services firms tend to 
remain unchanged on average for just less than one year, whereas those set in trade and financial services seem to be 
more flexible, with durations of 7 and 8 months, respectively. Conversely, average wage durations vary much less across 
sectors, with a low of 13 months in construction to a high of 15 in trade. No remarkable differences emerge in price 
durations between euro area and non-euro area countries. In the case of wages, the relatively higher duration recorded 
for the euro area aggregate is entirely due to Italy, where wages remain unchanged for around 2 years, consistently with 
the wage bargaining institutional setup (see Du Caju et al., 2008), whereas in all the remaining countries average duration 
is almost 12 months.
8  The robustness of the results reported below has been assessed by computing duration measures under alternative assumptions concerning the number 
of months corresponding to the frequency intervals that do not directly translate into a point estimate. These robustness tests are not shown here 
but are available from the authors upon request.
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2.2  THE TiMiNG OF ADJuSTMENT
In addition to the frequency of price and wage adjustment, and partly related to it, another indicator that signals the 
presence and extent of nominal rigidities is the nature of the adjustment itself. In order to account for the fact that 
individual firms do not continuously change their prices and wages in response to all the relevant shocks that hit them, in 
the literature firms’ strategies are modelled either as a time-dependent process, where the timing of the adjustment is 
exogenously given and does not depend on the state of the economy, or as a state-dependent one. In presence of frequent 
shocks, the former might lead to stickier prices and wages than the latter, provided that the time frame is quite large 
and the cost of adjustment is low enough. Hence, which of the two approaches reflects better firms’ actual behaviour has 
important implications for monetary policy makers.9 
In particular, the degree of bunching of wage setting decisions may have an impact on the transmission of monetary policy 
decisions to the real economy. For instance, Olivei and Tenreyro (2008) show that in Japan, where most firms set their 
wages between February and May, in what is known as “Shunto”, a monetary policy shock occurring in the first part of the 
year should produce a smaller impact on real activity, since this is a period of more flexible wages, than a shock occurring 
later in the year. Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) derive similar results for the U.S. where wage changes concentrate at the turn 
of the year; they find that monetary policy shocks that take place in the second half of the year have insignificant effects 
on aggregate activity.
9  According to IPN results, firms’ price setting is characterized by elements of both time and state dependence: on average 34 percent of firms use 
purely time-dependent rules, whereas around two-thirds adopt a mixed strategy (as in Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977). Most price adjustments occur at 
the beginning of the year (January) and after the summer period (especially in September).
Table 5
Estimated average duration of price and wage spells
(months)
Prices Wages
Total 9.6 14.9
Manufacturing 10.2 14.9
Construction 9.1 13.3
Trade 6.7 15.3
Market services 10.9 14.9
Financial intermediation 7.7 14.4
Euro area 9.6 15.0
Austria 9.1 12.5
Belgium 9.9 12.6
Spain 9.7 11.9
France 10.1 12.0
Greece 10.2 11.9
Ireland 8.5 12.8
Italy 9.5 20.3
Netherlands 9.1 13.9
Portugal 9.5 12.9
Slovenia 9.6 11.8
Non-Euro area 9.6 14.7
Czech Republic 9.7 14.6
Estonia 10.0 12.7
Hungary 10.7 13.8
Lithuania 8.4 11.4
Poland 9.5 15.4
Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. 
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With a view on obtaining more empirical evidence on these issues, in the WDN survey firms were asked to specify whether 
their wage and price changes take place with no predefined pattern or are concentrated in particular month(s) (see Appendix 
2, questions 10 and 32). The results reported in Figure 1 show that time-dependent wage adjustment is significantly more 
widespread as a rule adopted by firms than time-dependent price adjustment. Indeed, the fraction of firms that typically 
change wages in specific months is 54 percent, whereas in the case of prices it amounts to 35 percent. Among these firms, 
there appears to be a considerable degree of synchronisation in the timing of both price and wage change, with significant 
clustering in January. In the case of wage adjustment, smaller peaks also appear in July and April.
Looking at the sectoral dimension, the variability in the adoption of regular time-dependent rules in price revisions is quite 
remarkable, consistently with the high dispersion found in the frequency of the revisions themselves. The concentration in 
particular months is least common in financial services and more widespread in market services (Figure 2); in all sectors 
January is the month when the largest part of price changes occurs. Conversely, the pattern of concentration of wage 
Figure 1
Timing of wage and price changes at the firm level
(percentages of firms reporting to change wages/prices in a particular month)
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Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses.
Figure 2
Time-dependent price and wage adjustment across sectors
(percentages of firms reporting to change wages/prices in a particular month)
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Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses.
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changes is very similar across sectors, although slightly below average in construction and trade. Also in this case, wage 
adjustments occur mostly in January in all sectors, though July also has some significance in manufacturing and market 
services and more staggering across different months is detected in financial services. While in all sectors wage changes are 
generally more time-dependent than price changes, the difference is particularly pronounced in financial intermediation, 
where only 12 percent of firms follow this type of rule for prices, as against 59 percent for wages.
The finding that time-dependent adjustment mechanisms are more widespread for wages than for prices might be related 
to the existence of wage indexation mechanisms in some countries, as well as to the presence of institutional arrangements 
within the firm itself or at the national or sectoral level. Indeed, the cross-country differences in both the incidence of 
time-dependence and the timing of wage changes are quite remarkable. Lithuania is the country with the lowest fraction 
of wage changes concentrated in specific months (17 percent); at the other extreme Portugal has the highest fraction 
(94 percent). This indicator of relative wage rigidity is consistent with the respectively high and low frequency of wage 
adjustment found in the two countries (see Section 1). More generally, the percentage of firms that adopt time-dependent 
wage rules exceeds 70 percent in Spain, the Netherlands, France and Greece and is overall much higher for euro area 
countries (61 percent) than for non-euro area ones (34 percent), possibly in relation to the more widespread diffusion of 
collective bargaining agreements and indexation clauses in the euro area.
There appears to be a significant geographical variability also in the timing of wage adjustments. Although in all economies 
the majority of time-dependent wage changes occur in January, other specific months are indicated by relatively large 
shares of firms: July in Belgium, France and Lithuania; May in Austria; August in Slovenia, April in Ireland and September in 
Greece. These country-specificities in the time-patterns of wage change are confirmed both by micro wage data available 
at an infra-annual level and by the analysis of collective agreements carried out in the context of the WDN (see Du Caju et 
al., 2008), showing that the monthly pattern of wage changes is linked to the timing of wage negotiations.10 Some variation 
across countries can also be observed in the pervasiveness of time-dependent pricing, albeit less pronounced than in the 
case of wages (Figure 3). Overall, the fraction of euro area firms that carry out price adjustments with a regular timing is 
higher than in non-euro area countries as a whole (42 vs 17 percent, respectively). In all economies, most price changes 
occur in January. 
Figure 3
Time-dependent price and wage adjustment across countries
(percentages of firms reporting to change wages/prices in a particular month)
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Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses.
10  The peak in the frequency of wage change in the beginning of each year emerges also from other studies conducted within the WDN on the basis of 
micro quantitative data for a number of individual countries (Knell and Stiglbauer, 2008 for Austria; Heckel et al., 2008 for France, Lünnemann and 
Wintr, 2008 for Luxembourg).
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2.3  THE iNTERAcTiON BETWEEN WAGE AND PRicE ADJuSTMENT
Having assessed the degree of rigidity of wages and prices as captured by the frequency and the nature of the adjustment 
process, we focus explicitly on the interaction between wage and pricing policies at the firm level. In this context we 
address both the issue of whether firms’ wage and price adjustment are related (and the causal link between the two) and 
the extent to which they actually feed into each other.
The WDN survey provides direct information on various aspects of this relationship, such as the link between price and 
wage changes at the firm level, the response of the former to wage shocks, the existence and nature of internal policies 
adjusting wages to inflation and the frequency of wage changes due to inflation.
One of the findings stemming from the analysis in Section 2.2 is that there appears to be some broad synchronisation 
between the timing of price and wage changes, with peaks in January in both cases. Indeed, when looking at individual 
firms, it turns out that around half of those that change prices in January also adjust wages in the same month. This 
evidence is confirmed by the fact that, when explicitly asked about how the timing of price changes relates to that of 
wage changes within their company (see Appendix 2, question 33), around 40 percent of firms acknowledge the existence 
of some relationship between the two (Figure 4). However, only 15 percent state that this relationship is relatively strong. 
For half of them decisions on price changes follow those on wage changes. The opposite holds for another 3 percent, 
while decisions are simultaneous in the remaining 4 percent. The patterns with respect to intensity and direction of the 
relationship are very similar across sectors and across countries.
Figure 4
The relationship between wage and price changes at the firm level
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Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses.
The finding that the majority of firms (60 percent) does not explicitly recognise a direct relationship between their 
“typical” price and wage change decisions does not automatically imply that the two policies are not related. Indeed, other 
pieces of evidence arising from the WDN survey suggest that wages and prices feed into each other at the micro level.
The existence and extent of the pass-through of wages into prices can be gauged by analysing the strategies firms declare 
to implement in reaction to shocks. Indeed, when asked to assess the relevance of different adjustments policies to a 
common permanent unexpected increase in wages about 60 percent of firms reported that they would increase prices 
(see Table 6 and ECB, 2009). The possible options they could choose among where: i) a reduction in (other) costs; ii) an 
adjustment of prices; iii) a reduction of profit margins; iv) a reduction in output.
In a study also based on the WDN survey, Bertola et al. (2008) argue that the pass-through of wages into prices is particularly 
strong in firms with a high labour share, confirming previous evidence from the IPN that prices are stickier in sectors 
typically characterised by a high incidence of labour costs. Conversely, the extent to which wages feed into prices is 
MAGyAR NEMZETI BANK
mnb occasional papers 102. • 201218
inversely related to the intensity of competitive pressures faced by the firms, their exposure to foreign markets and their 
size.11 Additional empirical evidence, based on alternative data and methods, of wage changes having a substantial impact 
on price dynamics at the firm level is rather limited. Studies carried out in the context of the WDN, focused on national 
micro data, find in general a significant but very low elasticity of prices to wages or labour costs (see Loupias and Sevestre, 
2008; Rosolia and Venditti, 2008; Carlsson and Nordstrom Skans, 2008).
Table 6
Adjustment strategies to shocks
(firms answering “relevant” or “very relevant”, percentages)
cost-push shock Wage shock Demand shock
Reduce (other) costs 67.6 59.0 78.0
Adjust prices 65.6 59.2 50.5
Reduce margins 53.5 49.8 56.6
Reduce output 21.4 22.5 49.9
Notes: Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. Greece is excluded from all the calculations and in addition Italy 
and Spain are excluded in the case of a demand shock. 
Turning to the evidence concerning the impact of prices on wages, an important element is the extent and speed to which 
wage changes in the firms are related to the general inflationary outlook. The existence and strength of this relationship 
is determined both by companies internal strategies adapting wages to inflation and by the characteristics of the national 
institutional settings, in particular the presence or not of indexation rules. The nature of these mechanisms − specific to 
the firm or set at the national level, formal or informal, forward or backward looking − is, hence, of extreme relevance 
from a policy perspective. Two questions on this issue were included in the survey (see Appendix 2, questions 6 and 7). 
Firms were first asked whether or not they have an internal policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation. If so, they 
had to report whether the adjustment (a) is automatic or not, (b) is subject to a formal rule, (c) refers to past or expected 
inflation (“backward” or “forward” looking).
Figure 5 shows that on average only one-third of the firms have an internal policy adapting wages to inflation. Among them, 
nearly half adopt an automatic indexation mechanism, mostly of a backward looking nature, while the other half takes 
inflation into account without applying any formal rule. There is some variability across sectors: the existence of an internal 
indexation policy is less common in market services and more widespread in financial intermediation and construction.
11 All these results are confirmed by the multivariate regression analysis reported in Section 3.
Figure 5
Adjustment of base wages to inflation across sectors
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Table 7 summarises the information on formal and informal indexation mechanisms at the firm level across countries. It 
shows that the adjustment of wages to inflation is very common in Belgium and Spain (98 and 70 percent, respectively), 
where automatic indexation mechanisms are prevalent. Dutch and Italian firms, on the other hand, do not (or do it only 
marginally) adapt wages to inflation. In the remaining countries these internal mechanisms, mostly informal, are used to 
some extent. Expected inflation is more relevant for wage setting than past inflation only in Portugal.12 Overall, informal 
policies that link base wages to inflation are more widespread in non-euro area countries than in euro area ones, while the 
opposite holds in the case of formal automatic adjustment mechanisms.
The firm-level evidence reported so far complements information available from other sources on indexation at the country 
and sectoral level. The dataset on wage bargaining institutions collected within the WDN (see Du Caju et al., 2008) provides 
an overview of existence and coverage of formal wage indexation mechanisms across countries, developing a summary 
indicator of country-level indexation. According to this measure, reported in the last column of Table 7, workers are to 
some extent covered by formal wage indexation clauses in only seven of the countries examined here, coverage being 
particularly high in Belgium and Spain, low in Slovenia and very low in Austria, France, Italy and Poland. 
Table 7
Adjustment of base wages to inflation: country overview (1)
(percentages)
 
Firm-level policies (2)
country-level 
indexation
(3)
Automatic link 
to inflation
No formal rule, 
but inflation considered Total
 Past Expected Past Expected
AT 8.6 1.3 9.2 2.8 22.0 Very low
BE 98.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.2 High
CZ 5.8 2.6 26.4 22.1 56.9 None
EE 2.6 1.3 31.4 15.0 50.3 None
ES 38.3 16.2 10.9 5.0 70.4 High
FR 4.9 1.0 16.5 4.9 27.3 Very low
GR 14.8 5.2 12.1 10.6 42.7 None
HU 7.2 4.2 14.0 5.9 33.0 None
IE 2.4 2.8 11.2 9.5 26.1 None
IT 1.2 0.5 2.6 1.5 5.8 Very low
LT 7.3 3.7 24.3 12.9 48.1
NL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 None
PL 4.7 2.5 17.3 6.1 30.6 Very low
PT 2.7 6.5 13.3 29.1 51.6 None
SI 20.3 2.7 32.2 5.1 60.3 Low
Total 11.5 3.3 10.9 5.8 31.7
Euro area 13.8 3.5 7.8 4.5 29.7
Non Euro area 5.3 2.8 19.3 9.5 37.2
Notes: (1) Since some firms use a number of different methods of adjustment to inflation, the total may not be equal to the sum of the four methods. 
(2) Figures weighted by employment weights, rescaled excluding non-responses. (3) Percentage of workers covered by wage indexations clauses: Very 
low: 1-25%; Low: 26-50%; Moderate: 51-75%; High: 76-100% (Source: Du Caju et al., 2008).
Overall, information obtained from the WDN firm-level survey and the analysis of national wage bargaining systems suggest 
that, though formal or institutional indexation mechanisms are not a common feature across Europe, price developments are 
an important factor entering firms’ wage policies in many countries. Indeed, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland and Portugal, inflation is taken into account by a significant fraction of firms without relying on automatic or formal rules.
12  In the case of Germany, firms were not explicitly asked whether or not they have a policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation. Nevertheless, 
when asked about the two main factors that determined the most recent wage increases, 27 percent of German firms replies that inflation was one 
of them.
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A final piece of evidence provided by the WDN survey on how inflation developments affect firms’ wage decisions concerns 
the frequency of wage adjustments due to inflation. Figure 6 shows that inflation stands out as the prevalent factor 
triggering frequent wage adjustment (at an annual or infra-annual frequency). Sectoral heterogeneity is quite limited in 
contrast with the variability across countries which is, instead, remarkably large (Figure 7):13 while in Austria, Belgium and 
Spain over 80 percent of firms change wages annually or more frequently due to inflation, in Italy only 15 percent do that 
(60 percent report that they never adopt this policy).14
13  The Netherlands was not considered as Dutch firms do not adapt wages to inflation.
14  Data for Greece here have a slightly different interpretation, as the option “never/don’t know” was not allowed in the Greek questionnaire, the 
percentages are within the firms that actually change wages due to inflation.
Figure 6
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Figure 7
Frequency of wage changes due to inflation across countries
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In this section we investigate, within a multivariate framework, the potential factors that may lie behind the frequency 
of price and wage changes at the firm level. We account for differences that could be country, sector or firm size specific 
and focus on the features that could potentially affect firms’ strategies. Some of them reflect the institutional setup, like 
the degree of wage indexation and the nature and coverage of collective bargaining, both at the firm and the country 
level. Other differences are related to the economic and technological environment, such as the degree of product market 
competition, the firms’ exposure in terms of external trade, labour intensity and the characteristics and composition of the 
labour force (share of white collars, of high skill workers, of permanent jobs, etc.). The factors considered in this analysis 
are described below.
Intensity of product market competition. Whereas in the theoretical literature the relationship between market power 
and price stickiness is not clear-cut, there is an ample number of studies providing empirical evidence on the issue. 
Carlton (1986) and Hall et al. (2000) find that more competitive firms tend to adjust prices faster that firms facing less 
elastic demand. Geroski (1992) shows that price reaction to shocks is faster in more competitive industries. Álvarez and 
Hernando (2007) analyze the relationship between price flexibility and competition, focusing on euro area manufacturing 
and services industries. They conclude inter alia that price setting strategies of the most competitive firms give them 
greater room of manoeuvre to react to shocks. 
From an empirical viewpoint, measuring the degree of competition and in particular disentangling a situation of perfect 
competition and price taking agents from one of imperfect competition is not straightforward. This difficulty is even more 
pronounced in the context of survey data, where only qualitative information at the firm level is available, whereas the 
typical measures adopted in the literature rely on quantitative sectoral indicators or, at the micro level, on measures such 
as the number of competitors or the firm’s market share. The information provided by the WDN survey allows constructing 
a number of proxies for the intensity of competitive pressures faced by the firms. The first is the relevance of competitors’ 
pricing strategies; firms are asked (Appendix 2; question 30) to report the likelihood that a price reduction by competitors 
leads to a similar reaction by them. The second measure is based on the firms’ own assessment of the intensity of 
competition in their reference market (question 29).15 Since this indicator, which would be the preferred candidate to be 
used in our empirical analysis, is not available for 4 countries, we have to rely primarily on the first proxy. However, we 
will show below that our results are robust to the choice of the competition measure.
Finally, as a large number of the firms included in the WDN survey operate on foreign markets, to capture the specific 
competitive pressures faced by them, we construct an indicator of the firm’s international exposure, proxied by the share 
of exports on total sales (question 27).
Share of labour costs in total costs − Evidence arising from studies carried out in the context of the IPN, based both 
on survey firm-level information and on quantitative producer prices micro data (see Fabiani et al., 2007, and Vermeulen 
et al., 2007) suggests a negative relationship between the incidence of labour on total costs and the frequency of price 
adjustment. The WDN survey allows addressing this potential relationship by directly asking firms the fraction of their total 
costs due to labour (question 40).
15  Based on the IPN results, questions on these more standard measures (number of competitors and the market share) were not included in the WDN 
survey, to reduce the burden on the firms. Indeed, in the survey studies conducted within the IPN the indicator based on firms’ reaction to 
competitors’ pricing strategies, proved to be highly correlated with the standard measures (see Fabiani et al., 2007).
3  A firm level analysis of price and 
wage policies in a multivariate 
framework
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Characteristics and flexibility of the workforce − Price and wage adjustment strategies at the firm level could be 
influenced by the relative easiness of adjustment of the labour force. This depends on both the composition of the 
workforce and the prevailing nature of the relationship between the firm and its employees. The WDN survey provides 
information on these aspects through a number of indicators: i) the incidence of permanent full-time employees on 
the total workforce (question 34); ii) the share of high-skilled and of white-collar employees (question 1); iii) for some 
countries, the tenure structure of the firms’ labour force (question 38).
Other adjustment means − Information available from the survey allows considering also margins of adjustment at the 
disposal of firms other than changing base wages and prices, which could affect price and wage change mechanisms. The 
indicators capturing these aspects in our regressions are the turnover of the workforce and the flexible component of the 
wage, namely the share of bonuses on the firm’s total wage bill.
Labour market institutions − The theoretical literature assigns an important role to wage bargaining institutions for wage 
stickiness and in particular to the degree of centralisation of wage settlements. Although the availability of comparable 
empirical data at an international level is quite limited due to the non-standardised nature of measures, the incomplete 
coverage of countries, periods and institutional features, empirical results based on micro data suggest that agreements 
bargained at the firm level tend to lead to higher wage flexibility by leaving firms greater margins for manoeuvre for 
reacting to economic fluctuations. The WDN survey allows to overcome the data limitations described above and to 
test this relationship on the basis of the information reported by firms on the characteristics of wage negotiations, both 
firm-specific and institutionally driven. Our empirical analysis relies on a set of covariates that include: i) the degree of 
centralisation of collective pay agreements, in particular, whether wages are mostly negotiated outside the firm, either 
at the national or sectoral level (question 2); ii) the existence of firm-level collective agreements (question 3); iii) the 
percentage of the firm’s employees covered by collective agreements, irrespective of their nature (question 4); iv) the 
existence within the firm of internal policies (automatic or not) aimed at adapting salaries to past or expected inflation 
(questions 6 and 7). In the wage frequency equation, we also include an indicator of the stringency of employment 
protection legislation, based on OECD data extended to eastern European countries following Tonin (2005).
Finally, we control for other firm’s characteristics through a set of variables that capture the economic sector of activity 
(manufacturing, construction, trade, business services, financial services), the size in terms of number of employees (5-19, 
20-49, 50-199, >199), the country the firm belongs to. These dummies also help to account for unobserved characteristics of 
the firm that might impact on the frequency of price and base wage changes but are not captured by the other explanatory 
variables.
3.1  ORDERED PROBiT ESTiMATiON
To better understand whether and to what extent the features described above are related to the rigidity of prices and 
base wages, both expressed in terms of frequency of adjustments, we estimate an ordered probit. In the case of prices, 
the dependent variable is a categorical one increasing with the degree of stickiness, it takes values from 1 to 4, where 
1=the firm change prices at a daily to monthly frequency; 2= the firm changes the price of the main product quarterly-
half-yearly or twice a year; 3=the price of the main product is changed once a year; 4=changed less frequently than once a 
year. Also in the case of wages, the value categories of the dependent variable are increasing in the degree of stickiness, 
from 1 to 3, where 1=the firm changes wages more frequently than yearly; 2= changes wages yearly; 3=changes wages less 
frequently than yearly.16 
16  In the case of prices, we drop category 5 (“no pattern”), as we do not have information on the effective frequency of price changes, and estimate 
the model only on the firms that have explicitly indicated that they have a pattern when changing prices, excluding about 25 percent of the initial 
sample. In the case of wages we also drop the last category (“never/don’t know”) which hardly amounts to 3 percent of the sample. In the regressions 
displayed in the text we consider the frequency of wage adjustment due to any reasons. However, a similar analysis conducted separately on the 
frequency of wage changes due to (i) reasons different from inflation and tenure (ii) inflation (iii) tenure, gives broadly similar results.
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Table 8 contains the probit estimates for frequency of price changes and Table 9 those for the frequency of wage changes.17 
In both tables, several specifications exploring the role of the features described above are shown. Tables A4.1 and A4.2 in 
Appendix 4 display the marginal effect of each variable when estimating the preferred specification (reported in column 5 
of Table 8 for prices, and column 7 of Table 9 for wages).
The results confirm that cross-sectoral differences matter both for the flexibility of prices and of wages. Our baseline 
specification (column 1 in both tables) shows that for firms operating in construction, trade and financial intermediation 
prices tend to be adjusted more frequently than in manufacturing (which is the reference category in the regression), while 
they are stickier in market services. In all services sectors, including trade, wages turn out to be significantly stickier than 
in manufacturing, whereas they are adjusted more frequently in construction.
We do not find strong evidence of relevant country-specific patterns for price change frequency.18 This turns out not to 
be the case for wage adjustment, as many of the country effects have a positive and significant coefficient, meaning that 
wages adjust somewhat less frequently than in the reference country, that is Estonia, whose labour market is one of the 
most flexible of the EU. Only for Greece, Lithuania and Slovenia the coefficient is negatively signed and significant.
Firms’ size influences the pattern of both price and wage adjustment, which in both cases is likely to happen more 
frequently in larger firms than in small ones (the omitted category in the regression is that of small firms with 5 to 19 
employees).
As already mentioned, our survey allows to explicitly assess to what extent the flexibility of the firm’s cost structure, 
proxied by the share of labour on total costs, affects the duration of prices and wages. The estimates reported in column 2 
in Table 8 show that the higher the fraction of firms’ costs accounted by labour, the lower the frequency of price changes. 
Interestingly, once we control for this variable the result that prices are stickier in market services vanishes, reflecting the 
fact that this sector is in general the one with the highest share of labour costs.19 The flexibility of the cost structure does 
not appear instead as being significantly correlated with wage behaviour (column 2, Table 9).
Turning to the role played by the economic environment and market forces, our estimates (columns 3) highlight that the 
degree of product market competition, proxied by the likelihood that a price reduction by competitors leads to a similar 
reaction in the firm, is negatively related to price stickiness. This result, which is robust to the use of the alternative 
measures of competitive pressures described above (as shown in Table 10), confirms earlier IPN findings that also pointed 
to a systematic positive relationship between the frequency of price revisions and changes and the intensity of competition 
pressures. These factors, instead, are not significant for wage adjustment. Prices are adjusted more frequently also in firms 
that are more exposed to foreign competition, as captured by the share of turnover generated on foreign markets.
The composition of the labour force and job-specific characteristics (columns 4 in Tables 8 and 9) only matter for the 
degree of price stickiness, the frequency of adjustment being negatively associated to the share of highly skilled personnel 
and of white-collars. 
Firms experiencing high labour force turnover seems to adjust more often both prices and wages (columns 5). In addition, 
firms that use other means of wage adjustments than base wages, as for example bonuses, also seem to adjust base wages 
more often.20
17  The ordered probit model may have some drawbacks. If, for example, all firms in a given country fall into the middle wage frequency category, the 
inclusion of the country dummy would affect the probability of firms falling in the other two categories, not enabling to draw sound conclusions on 
the lower or higher flexibility of wages. This however does not turn out to be a problem in our sample. First, in no case such an event occurs. Second, 
regressions based on a multinomial probit model provide similar results to those reported in Tables 8 and 9 (reesults are available upon request). 
18  Although country dummies are jointly significant in the price frequency regression, their exclusion, which is not shown in the table, does not change 
the size and significance of the other coefficients and the overall fit of the equation declines only slightly.
19  We also tried to allow for a non-linear relationship by, first, introducing the variable squared, which turned out to be not significant and, second, 
constructing categorical dummies for different ranges of the labour cost share [20, 40, 80, 100] but the results did not support non-linearity.
20  The difference between the wage paid by firms and the base wage, the so-called “wage cushion” (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005), could be a strategic 
buffer against adverse shocks; above all in a context where the downward nominal wage rigidity becomes an active restriction.
MAGyAR NEMZETI BANK
mnb occasional papers 102. • 201224
Table 8
Price rigidity
(ordered probit estimates, unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Construction −0.331** −0.354** −0.355** −0.349** −0.313** −0.369** −0.369**
Trade −0.689** −0.699** −0.745** −0.778** −0.753** −0.77** −0.77**
Market services  0.088**  0.033 −0.022 −0.041 −0.006 −0.035 −0.036
Financial intermediation −0.566** −0.644** −0.621** −0.825** −0.746** −0.672** −0.67**
20-49 −0.022 −0.031 −0.028 −0.008 −0.019 −0.018 −0.019
50-199 −0.15** −0.149** −0.148** −0.126** −0.131** −0.124** −0.125**
>200 −0.241** −0.226** −0.207** −0.162** −0.176** −0.168** −0.164**
AT  0.111  0.117  0.115  0.065  0.059  0.071  0.059
BE −0.026  0.025 −0.209 −0.122 −0.205 −0.217 −0.203
CZ −0.002 −0.018 −0.007  0.066  0.068  0.061  0.063
ES  0.012  0.007 −0.036 −0.018  0.001 −0.007 −0.002
FR −0.05 −0.072 −0.106 −0.129 −0.151 −0.111 −0.117
GR  0.113  0.085  0.118  0.018
HU  0.214**  0.179*  0.154  0.162  0.135  0.129  0.12
IE −0.1 −0.134 −0.158 −0.158 −0.19 −0.203 −0.212
IT −0.005  0.01 −0.014 −0.01 −0.026 −0.015 −0.032
LT −0.438** −0.496** −0.533** −0.506** −0.6 −0.613** −0.614**
NL −0.112* −0.172* −0.126 −0.122 −0.153 −0.161 −0.179
PL −0.06 −0.051 −0.036 −0.044 −0.091 −0.104 −0.114
PT −0.075 −0.068 −0.065 −0.072 −0.095 −0.092 −0.093
SI  0.031  0.037  0.086  0.114  0.076
labour cost share  0.42**  0.425**  0.448**  0.426**  0.508**  0.504**
competitive pressures −0.327** −0.32** −0.314** −0.301** −0.3**
export (% of sales) −0.109* −0.131** −0.106* −0.139* −0.141*
share of white collars  0.153**  0.168**  0.167**  0.169**
share of high skilled workers  0.076*  0.075*  0.087*  0.088*
share of full time permanent workers  0.106  0.025 −0.009 −0.008
workforce turnover −0.162** −0.15** −0.151**
share of bonuses on total wage bill  0.02  0.01  0.01
collective agreement outside the firm −0.067 −0.066
collective agreement at the firm level −0.03 −0.029
coverage of collective agreement  0.055  0.054
internal policy adjusting wages to prices −0.033
Observations 10,191 9,294 8,483 6,879 6,031 5,340 5,333
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.039 0.051 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.053
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the degree of rigidity, ranging 
from 1 to 4, where 1=prices changed at a daily to monthly frequency and 4=prices changed less frequently than once a year.
The introduction of the set of covariates capturing the institutional environment underlying wage policies and the 
functioning of the labour market (columns 6 and 7 in Table 8) does not improve the equation explaining price stickiness, as 
all these variables turn out as being not significant. Conversely, collective bargaining at the firm level improves the relative 
flexibility of wages (columns 6 and 7 in Table 9), whereas the stringency of employment protection legislation (EPL) and 
the coverage of collective agreements act in the opposite direction (columns 6 and 7). Finally, the existence of internal 
policies that adapt base wages to (past or expected) inflation turns out to be positively correlated with the frequency of 
wage change, confirming that inflation stands as an important driving force of infra-annual or annual wage adjustment (as 
shown in Figure 7). The results described above for the other covariates hold also when this variable is included, despite 
its potential endogeneity (see column 7 in Table 9).
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Table 9
Wage rigidity
(ordered probit estimates, unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Construction −0.331** −0.314** −0.113* −0.118* −0.133** −0.198** −0.213**
Trade  0.067*  0.08**  0.088**  0.059  0.125**  0.108**  0.108**
Market services  0.122**  0.136**  0.138**  0.13**  0.145**  0.12**  0.12**
Financial intermediation  0.093  0.121  0.269**  0.232**  0.285**  0.21*  0.24**
20-49 −0.054 −0.063* −0.102** −0.105** −0.083* −0.094* −0.1*
50-199 −0.174** −0.176** −0.217** −0.243** −0.183** −0.207** −0.208**
>200 −0.319** −0.311** −0.347** −0.348** −0.309** −0.331** −0.313**
AT  0.208*  0.205*  0.195*  0.158  0.221*  0.282*  0.161
BE −0.136 −0.125  0.156  0.075  0.351  0.15  0.305
CZ  0.648**  0.656**  0.69**  0.624**  0.725**  0.854**  0.852**
ES −0.032 −0.037 −0.017 −0.019 −0.08 −0.372* −0.308*
FR −0.09 −0.095 −0.065 −0.11 −0.115 −0.271** −0.365**
GR −0.357** −0.349** −0.316** −0.379**
HU  0.517**  0.471**  0.493**  0.473**  0.467**  0.715**  0.626**
IE  0.161  0.169  0.174  0.13  0.134  0.537**  0.443**
IT  1.681**  1.696**  1.754**  1.753**  1.678**  1.651**  1.459**
LT −0.455** −0.455** −0.469** −0.406** −0.511** −0.681** −0.692**
NL  0.456**  0.423**  0.419**  0.356**  0.338**  0.352**  0.138
PL  0.534**  0.531**  0.527**  0.487**  0.505*  0.565**  0.474**
PT  0.37**  0.361**  0.378**  0.379**  0.414**   
SI −0.259** −0.265** −0.27** −0.299** −0.269**
labour cost share −0.035 −0.019  0.003  0.031  0.054  0.026
competitive pressures −0.026 −0.023 −0.003  0.01  0.012
export (% of sales) −0.016  0 −0.017 −0.013 −0.023
share of white collars   0.057
share of high skilled workers   0.012
share of full time permanent workers   0.03
workforce turnover −0.157** −0.144** −0.17**
share of bonuses on total wage bill −0.167** −0.172** −0.16**
collective agreement outside the firm −0.055 −0.047
collective agreement at the firm level −0.112* −0.088*
coverage of collective agreement  0.089*  0.092*
EPL  0.104**  0.133**
internal policy adjusting wages to prices −0.393**
Observations 14121 12741 11605 9396 10070 8993 8974
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.094 0.097 0.093 0.100 0.101 0.117
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variable increases with the degree of rigidity, ranging 
from 1 to 3, where 1=wages changed more frequently that once a year and 4=wages changed less frequently than once a year.
Various pieces of evidence provided by the regressions, such as the relevance of the labour cost share in explaining the 
rigidity of price adjustment and the positive relationship between firm level policies adjusting wages to inflation point to a 
positive relationship between the duration of prices and that of wages at the firm level.21 This relationship is however likely 
to be affected by simultaneity and interdependences, which are formally addressed in the next section.
21  This is confirmed by the strong and significant correlation found when the frequency of price change is introduced as a covariate in the equation of 
wage changes and vice versa (results are not shown in Tables 8 and 9).
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3.2  DiSENTANGLiNG THE SiMuLTANEOuS RELATiONSHiP OF PRicE AND WAGE 
RiGiDiTY 
The connection between price and wage rigidities has long been investigated in the economic literature (see Taylor, 1999 
and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999, also for a review of the literature). The empirical studies have mainly focused on the 
behaviour of real wages over the business cycle, reaching little consensus on the cyclical pattern of the markup of price 
over costs. The richness of firm-level information contained in our survey, which however does not have a time dimension, 
allows to address this issue from a different perspective, namely focusing on the mechanism through which wage and price 
rigidities feed into each other.
The empirical analysis described in the previous section suggests that, indeed, there is an interaction between price and 
wage stickiness at the firm level. This result corroborates the evidence that a substantial share of firms acknowledge a 
relationship between the timing of their wage and price adjustment decisions, with half of those changing prices in January 
also adjusting wages in the same month.
Here we acknowledge the possible simultaneity of these two variables and allow for the relationship to run in both 
directions by estimating a system of equations of price and wage change frequencies:
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where freqpi and freqwi are, respectively, the frequency of price and wage changes in firm i, as in case of the probits in 
the previous section these are categorical variables increasing with the degree of stickiness, vector xi contains covariates 
common to both equations (it also includes variables on sector and size; see below about the omission of country dummies), 
vector zpi those variables that are assumed to affect the frequency of prices but not that of wages and, conversely, vector 
zwi those affecting the frequency of wages but not that of prices; ui and vi represent unobserved heterogeneity in price and 
wage change frequencies, respectively, and are allowed to be correlated.
The parameters of main interest are k and l: the former captures the effect of the duration of wages on prices, the latter 
that running from prices to wages. Both are identified by the exclusion restrictions, i.e. the presence of the zpi and zwi 
variables (instruments), whose choice is, therefore, of crucial importance.
The key principle in selecting the instruments relies on the notion that wage setting is affected by institutional factors 
that have no direct effect on prices, whereas price setting is influenced by product market characteristics that have no 
Table 10
Price rigidity and alternative measures of competitive pressures
(ordered probit estimates, unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perceived competition is severe or strong −0.324**
Very likely or likely to follow price reduction by competitors −0.327**
Perceived competition is severe −0.489**
Perceived competition is strong −0.305**
Perceived competition is weak −0.070
Very likely to follow price reduction by competitors −0.489**
Likely to follow price reduction by competitors −0.301**
Not likely to follow price reduction by competitors −0.057
Observations 7,065 9,555 9,555 7,065
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. Other covariates, not shown in the table, include country, sector 
and firm size dummies. The dependent variable increases with the degree of rigidity, ranging from 1 to 4, where 1=prices changed at a daily to monthly 
frequency and 4=prices changed less frequently than once a year.
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direct effect on wages, as emerged from the probit analysis carried out above. On this basis, the instruments in the price 
equation (zpi) are our measure of the degree of product market competition, the exposure to foreign markets, the share of 
labour costs on total costs, and some characteristics of the labour force at the firm level. Instruments in the wage equation 
(zwi) include, instead, the turnover of the firms’ workforce, the share of bonuses on the total wage bill, the presence of 
collective wage agreements at the firm level, their coverage and the degree of employment protection. In principle, if the 
instruments in the wage equation are to reflect institutional differences, they should come to a large extent from cross-
country variation. Controlling for country dummies in xi might therefore take out the most important source of variation 
in the instruments. This consideration has led us to run two different experiments. In the first, we remove all country 
dummies; in the second, we assume that the cross-country variation in wage setting strategies is due to institutional 
factors which do not affect prices, and therefore include country dummies in vector zwi. Results from both specifications 
are presented in Table 11.
It is important to remark that the evidence provided by the system estimates of k and l does not necessarily have to be 
consistent with the direct evidence from firms’ answers on the existence of a link between the timing of price and wage 
change decisions. In fact, the system estimates the relationship of price and wage change frequency by looking at whether 
those firms that, for some exogenous reason, change prices (wages) more frequently are also induced to change wages 
(prices) more frequently. Instead, the survey question is about the link of price and wage setting in general, with the answers 
spelling out the timing patterns. Though related, the two concepts are not the same. Furthermore, in the system the effects 
are identified by assumption from the exogenous variation in the frequency variables induced by their instruments.
Because of these differences it is possible to have firms that change wages more frequently when for some exogenous 
reason prices are also changed more frequently and at the same time to find no link or specific pattern in price and wage 
setting in general. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that in firms that report having a link running in one direction, the 
duration in price (wage) is not induced by that in wage (price). We can thus interpret the system estimates as looking 
at a specific kind of relationship between wage and price setting at the firm level as opposed to the more general link 
investigated before.
Table 11
System estimates on price and wage rigidity
(3-stage least squares, unweighted)
(1) (2) (3)
freq. of 
wage change
freq. of 
price change
freq. of 
wage change
freq. of 
price change
freq. of 
wage change
freq. of 
price change
frequency of price change  0.069 0.065  0.07
frequency of wage change  0.507**  0.135*  0.124*
labour cost share  0.26**  0.284**  0.281**
competitive pressures −0.207** −0.215** −0.215**
export (% of sales) −0.092* −0.089* −0.091*
share of white collars  0.106**  0.106**  0.108**
share of high skilled workers  0.074**  0.066**  0.066
share of bonuses on total wage bill −0.005 −0.052** −0.046**
workforce turnover −0.08** −0.073** −0.079**
collective agreement at the firm level −0.051** −0.031 −0.022
coverage of collective agreement  0.085**  0.028  0.027
EPL −0.126**  0.763**  0.792**
internal policy adjusting wages to prices −0.15**
country dummies No No yes yes yes yes
sector and firm size yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 5,217 5,217 5,217 5,217 5,211 5,211
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. The dependent variables increase with the degree of rigidity (see 
notes to Tables 8 and 9).
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The system is estimated by three-stage least squares. Table 11 presents the results of the most important parameters.22 
The estimates establish a statistically significant relationship from the frequency of wage changes to that of prices; the 
effect in the opposite direction is not significant. The instruments are strong and show effects that are intuitive in most 
cases and are similar to the previous probit estimates (where the price and wage frequency equations can be viewed as 
reduced-form versions of the system estimated here). Prices are adjusted significantly more often in firms that (a) face 
stronger product market competition, (b) are more export-oriented, (c) have a more flexible structure of the workforce, 
and (d) present a lower incidence of labour costs.
22 The full set of results is available from the authors upon request.
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This paper provides new evidence on firms’ price and wage adjustment across European firms, with a particular emphasis 
on the presence and degree of nominal rigidities. It focuses on three specific aspects related to this issue: the frequency 
of wage and price changes; the prevailing mechanism of adjustment and its timing; the extent to which wage and price 
changes feed into each other. The main conclusions are the following.
Firms adjust wages less frequently than prices. The former tend to remain unchanged for about 15 months on average, 
while the latter for around 10 months (in line with previous estimates from the IPN).
The cross-sectoral variation in the frequency of price adjustment is large compared to that of wage adjustment. Instead, 
country differences are larger for wage change frequencies than for price change frequencies. This evidence possibly 
reflects the fact that the economic context in which individual firms operate, which is likely to differ substantially across 
sectors, is crucial for pricing strategies, whereas the institutional setting, which is strongly country-specific, matters 
mostly in shaping wage adjustments strategies. 
Indeed, a multivariate analysis of the determinants of price and wage rigidity at the firm level confirms that more frequent 
price adjustments are associated with higher intensity of competitive pressures and exposure to foreign markets, as well 
as with a lower share of labour costs on total costs (consistently, prices are found to be stickier in business services). 
Conversely, wages tend to be more flexible in the presence of firm-level collective wage agreements whereas the stringency 
of employment protection legislation (EPL) and the coverage of collective agreements act in the opposite direction. There 
is also a correlation between frequency of wage changes and the presence of (formal or informal) indexation mechanisms 
of wages to inflation.
The extent of wage and price rigidities is also related to the adjustment mechanisms adopted by firms, time-dependent 
strategies delivering, in general, higher rigidity. On average, 54 percent of firms report that wage changes are concentrated 
in a particular month, mostly January. On the contrary, only one-third of firms adopt time-dependent pricing rules. For 
both prices and wages the concentration of adjustments in specific months is significantly higher in euro area countries 
than in new EU member states. In the case of wages, this might reflect the more widespread adoption of indexation 
clauses in the euro area as well as the higher importance of collective wage agreements, which enhance coordinated wage 
adjustments.
Various pieces of evidence confirm that wages and prices feed into each other at the micro level and that there is a 
relationship between wage and price rigidity. First, around half of the firms that change prices in January also change 
wages in that month. Second, 40 percent of the firms acknowledge a relationship (formal or informal) between the timing 
of their wage and price adjustment decisions. Third, when asked to assess the relevance of different adjustments policies 
to a common permanent unexpected increase in wages, about 60 percent of firms report that they would increase prices. 
Fourth, firm-level wage changes appear to be related to the general inflationary outlook, whether due to the existence of 
internal policies adapting wages to inflation or to the national institutional setting. Fifth, firms with a high labour cost share 
report a tighter link between price and wage changes and a lower frequency of price adjustment. Finally, even accounting 
for the likely simultaneity between price and wage changes, a statistically significant relationship is found, running from 
the frequency of wage changes to that of prices.
The results can help to improve the calibration of New Keynesian macro models with price and wage stickiness. In particular, 
the implication of our empirical evidence regarding for instance average wage and price duration, synchronization between 
wage and price adjustment, the presence of a “January effect”, have started to be investigated more closely in the context 
conclusions
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of the WDN (see De Walque et al., 2009). It must be kept in mind, however, that the surveys were carried out in a period 
characterized by a relatively stable economic environment. Firms’ price and wage setting in the context of exceptionally 
unstable economic and financial conditions is ongoing research.
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The WDN-survey project involved all euro area countries except Finland and Malta,23 as well as Estonia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania and Poland (in total, 17 countries). The group opted for a decentralised approach in which each National 
Central Bank was responsible for carrying out the survey within its country. However, strong coordination guaranteed that 
the national questionnaires, at least with respect to a subset of clearly pre-defined “core questions”, were almost fully 
harmonized.
This paper is based on results for all countries except Luxembourg and Germany: for the former results were not available 
yet at the time of completing the paper, while for the latter country results turned out not to be comparable due to major 
differences in the questionnaire actually sent to German firms.
The national surveys were carried out between the second half of 2007 and the first half of 2008. Their main characteristics 
are summarised in Table A1.1. In most cases the survey was outsourced to an external company, which collected the 
answers from firms mainly by traditional mail or the internet. Operational instructions were added to the questionnaire, in 
particular regarding (i) the person who preferably was required to fill in the questionnaire (the CEO or the Human Resource 
Manager), (ii) the business unit answers should refer to (the firm and not the establishment), and (iii) the reference period 
(period covered by the latest 12-month profit and loss account, or, for a few questions, the end of the reference period). 
All NCB’s pre-tested the questionnaire on a pilot sample.
The branches of activity underlying the samples vary across countries; for the purpose of the common empirical analysis, 
firms have been grouped in 6 sectors: manufacturing, trade, market services, construction, energy and financial 
intermediation; as shown in Table A1.1, all national samples cover the first three sectors (except Germany, where trade is 
not covered); in many surveys construction, energy and financial intermediation were also considered, whereas non-market 
services were included in five country samples only. Because of the poor coverage in terms of number of interviewed firms, 
the energy sector and non-market services were excluded from the cross-country analysis.
Concerning firm size, the sample was split up into four classes: 5 to 19 employees, 20 to 49 employees, 50 to 199 employees 
and 200 employees and more. Since very small firms (with less than 5 employees) were covered in Germany, Greece, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Spain and Poland only, they were excluded from the harmonised analysis of the results.
The sample size was quite different across countries, ranging from 1,400 in Estonia to 6,500 in France. In terms of response 
rate, three broad groups can be identified: Austria, Greece and Lithuania with a response rate below 20 percent; a large 
group of countries with response rates between 20 and 50 percent; and Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and 
Spain with above 50 percent. Overall, more than 17,000 firms were surveyed. In this paper, results for almost 15,000 firms 
are analyzed.
23 The survey was conducted in Cyprus at a later stage. 
Appendix 1 − The survey
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Table A1.1
The main characteristics of the national surveys
country
Sectoral 
coverage
Firms’ size
Sample 
size
Number of 
respondents
(response rate)
Ad hoc 
survey?
Geographical 
breakdown
Who carried 
out the 
survey
How was the 
survey carried 
out
Austria
Manufacturing 
(+energy) 
Construction 
Trade 
Market services
Fin. intermed.
≥ 5
~ 3,500 557
(16%)
Ad hoc No
External
company
(WIFO)
Traditional mail 
and Internet
Belgium
Manufacturing 
(+energy)
Construction
Trade
Market services
Fin. intermed.
≥ 5 ~ 4,100
1,431
(35%)
Ad hoc
on the 
business 
survey 
sample 
No NBB Traditional mail
Czech Rep.
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade 
Market services 
≥ 20 1,591
399
(25%)
Ad hoc No
CNB 
branches
Internet
Estonia
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade 
Market services 
≥ 5 ~ 1,400
366
(26%)
Ad hoc
yes (Tallinn–
non-Tallinn)
External 
company
Internet
France
Manufacturing 
Trade 
Market. services 
Non-market 
services
≥20 industry
≥ 5 services
~ 6,550
2,029
(31%)
Ad hoc yes
Local 
branches
Phone,
mail, and face 
to face
Germany
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Non-market 
services
All 4,600 
1,832
(40%)
Attached to 
IFO business 
survey
East-West IFO Traditional mail
Greece
Manufacturing 
Trade 
Market services
Non-market 
services 
All 5,000
429
(9%)
Ad hoc All regions
External 
company
Traditional mail
Hungary
Manufacturing 
(+energy)
Construction 
Trade 
Market services 
Fin. intermed.
≥ 5 3,785
2,006
(53%)
Ad hoc
All regions, 
stratified by 
NUTS1 
regions
External 
company
Face-to-face 
interview
Ireland
Manufacturing 
(+energy)
Construction 
Trade 
Market services 
Fin. intermed.
Non-market 
services
≥ 5 ~ 4,000
985
(25%)
Ad hoc No
External 
company
Traditional 
mail, phone
Italy
Manufacturing 
Trade 
Market services 
Fin. intermed.
≥ 5 ~ 4,000
953
(24%)
Ad hoc yes
External 
company
Internet
Lithuania
Manufacturing 
(+energy)
Construction 
Trade 
Market services 
Fin. intermed.
All 2,810
343
(12%)
Ad hoc No
External 
company
Phone, mail, 
face-to-face
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country
Sectoral 
coverage
Firms’ size
Sample 
size
Number of 
respondents
(response rate)
Ad hoc 
survey?
Geographical 
breakdown
Who carried 
out the 
survey
How was the 
survey carried 
out
Luxembourg
Manufacturing 
(+energy)
Construction 
Trade 
Market services
Fin. Intermed
≥ 1 >7,000
survey not 
finished yet
Ad hoc No BCL Email
Netherlands
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade 
Market services 
Fin. intermed.
≥ 5 2,116
1,068
(50%)
Ad hoc No
External 
company
Internet
Poland
Manufacturing 
(+energy)
Construction 
Trade 
Market services 
Fin. intermed.
All ~1,600
1,161
(73%)
Ad hoc +
attached to 
the labour 
market 
survey
All regions
National 
Bank of 
Poland
(branches)
Traditional mail
Portugal
Manufacturing 
(+energy) 
Construction 
Trade 
Market services 
Fin. intermed.
Non-market 
services
≥ 10 ~5,000
1,436
(29%)
Ad hoc No
Banco de 
Portugal
Traditional mail 
and Internet
Slovenia
Manufacturing 
(+energy) 
Construction 
Trade
Market services
Fin. intermed.
≥ 5 ~ 3,000
666
(22%)
Ad hoc No
Banka 
Slovenije
Traditional mail 
and Internet
Spain
Manufacturing 
(+energy) 
Trade
Market Services
All 3,000
1,835
(61%)
Ad hoc No
External 
company
Mail, phone, fax 
or Internet
Table A1.1
The main characteristics of the national surveys (cont’d)
mnb occasional papers 102. • 201234
Appendix 2 − The WDN survey 
questionnaire
Wage setting and wage changes
This section focuses on information on wage setting practices, on the frequency and timing of wage changes. it also collects 
information on how the wages of new workers are set relative to those of existing workers. unless otherwise indicated, answers 
should refer to “normal conditions and practices”.
1 − How were your firm’s employees distributed across the following occupational groups at the end of the reference period?
For the definition of employees and of occupational groups, see the Appendix.
Low skilled blue collar/Production ____%
High skilled blue collar/Technical ____%
Low skilled white collar/Clerical ____%
High skilled white collar/Professional ____%
Other ____%
TOTAL ( = 100%) 100 %
2 − Does your firm apply a collective pay agreement bargained and signed outside the firm (at the national, regional, sectoral or 
occupational level)?
No, such an agreement does not exist 
No, we opt out 
yes, we apply such an agreement 
3 − Notwithstanding your answer to question 2, does your firm apply a collective pay agreement signed at the firm level?
yes 
No 
4 − if “yes” in questions 2 or 3, what percentage of your firm’s employees are covered by a collective pay agreement (at any level)?
_______ %
5 − What percentage of your total wage bill in the “reference period” was related to individual or company performance related 
bonuses or benefits?
Definition of bonuses / benefits (flexible wage components) − part of compensation different from the base wage and usually linked 
to individual’s performance. 
_____ %
6 − Does your firm have a policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation?
Definition of base wage − direct remuneration excluding bonuses (regular wage and salary, commissions, piecework payments). 
No   → GO TO QUESTION 8
yes 
7 − if “yes” in question 6, please select the options that best reflects the policy followed:
Wage changes are automatically linked to:
 − past inflation 
 − expected inflation 
Although there is no formal rule, wage changes take into account:
 − past inflation 
 − expected inflation 
8 − NON-cORE What is the principle of remuneration for the main occupational group (as defined in question 1)?
Please choose a single option
Definition of hourly, piece-rate and monthly base wage − base wage per hour worked, per month worked, or per pieces produced.
Hourly base wage 
Piece-rate base wage 
Monthly base wage {or other period-specific wage} 
Other {please specify} ______________________________________ 
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APPENDIx 2 − THE WDN SURVEy QUESTIONNAIRE
9 − How frequently is the base wage of an employee belonging to the main occupational group in your firm (as defined in question 
1) typically changed in your firm? 
Please tick an option for each of the three types of wage changes listed below.
more than once 
a year
once a year
once every two 
years
less frequently 
than once every 
two years
never/
don’t know
Wage changes apart from tenure and/or 
inflation
    
Wage changes due to tenure     
Wage changes due to inflation     
10 − under normal circumstances, are base wage changes concentrated in any particular month / months?
No        
yes:     Jan.       Feb.      Mar.      Apr.      May      June      July      Aug.      Sept.      Oct.      Nov.      Dec. 
11 − considering the main occupational group in your firm (as identified in question 1), please indicate among the following options 
which is the most relevant factor in determining the entry wage of newly hired employees:
Please choose a single option
Collective pay agreement (signed at any level) 
Wage of similar employees in the firm 
Wage of similar workers outside the firm 
Availability of workers with similar characteristics in the labour market 
Other reasons (please specify) _______________________________ 
12 − NON-cORE if there is abundance in the labour market of workers you need to hire, do you pay newly hired employees 
significantly lower wage than that of similar (in terms of experience and qualitfication) employees already in the firm?
yes 
No, because (please choose a single option, the most important reason): 
a) It would be perceived as unfair and earn the firm bad reputation 
b) it would have a negative effect on the work effort of the new employees 
c) It is not allowed by labour regulation or collective pay agreement 
d) Unions would contest such action 
e) Other reasons (please specify)__________________________________________ 
13 − NON-cORE if there is a shortage in the labour market of workers you need to hire and attracting new workers is difficult,  
do you give newly hired employees significantly higher wage than that of similarly qualified employees already in the firm?
yes 
No, because (please choose a single option, the most important reason):
a) It would be perceived as unfair by existing employees 
b) It would have a negative effect on work effort of the employees in the firm 
c) It is not allowed by labour regulation or collective pay agreement 
d) It would generate pressure for wage increases by existing employees 
e) Other reasons (please specify)__________________________________________ 
Downward wage rigidity and the adjustment to shocks
This section addresses the issue of the presence of (potential) obstacles to downward wage adjustments and the reaction of firms  
to different shocks.
14 − Over the last five years, has the base wage of some employees in your firm ever been frozen? 
Definition of freeze in base wage − base wage in nominal terms remains unchanged from a pay negotiation to the next. 
 − No 
 − yes (indicate for what percentage of your employees) _____%
15 − Over the last five years, has the base wage of some employees in your firm ever been cut?
Definition of cut in base wage − base wage in nominal terms decreases from a pay negotiation to the next.
 − No 
 − yes (indicate for what percentage of your employees) _____%
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16 − NON-cORE if “yes” in either question 14 or 15, what was the main reason for freezing/reducing the base wage? 
Please choose a single option, the most important reason.
Profitability and/or sales went down 
Other costs increased 
Jobs were at risk 
It was imposed by legislation or a higher level collective agreement 
Because worker performance was not satisfactory 
Other reasons (please specify)__________________________________ 
17 − How relevant is each one of the following reasons in preventing base wage cuts?
Please tick an option for each line.
not 
relevant
of little 
relevance
relevant
very 
relevant
don’t 
know 
Labour regulation/collective agreements prevent wages from 
being cut
    
It would reduce employees’ efforts, resulting in less output 
or poorer service
    
It would have a negative impact on employees’ morale     
It would damage the firm’s reputation as an employer, 
making it more difficult to hire workers in the future
    
In presence of a wage cut the most productive employees 
might leave the firm
    
A wage cut would increase the number of employees who 
quit, increasing the cost of hiring and training new workers 
    
It would create difficulties in attracting new workers     
Workers dislike unpredictable reductions in income. 
Therefore workers and firms reach an implicit understanding 
that wages will neither fall in recessions nor rise in 
expansions
    
Employees compare their wage to that of similarly qualified 
workers in other firms in the same market
    
18 − NON-cORE Has any of the following strategies ever been used in your firm to reduce labour costs? 
Please choose as many options as apply to your firm.
Reduction or elimination of bonus payments 
Reduction or elimination of non-pay benefits 
Change in shift assignments 
Slowdown or freeze of the rate at which promotions are filled 
Recruitment of new employees (with similar skills and experience) at lower wage than those who left (e.g due to voluntary 
quits and retirement)

Use of early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with lower wages 
Other strategies (please specify) _______________________________________________ 
19 − NON-cORE Has it become easier over the last decade to adjust wages to reduce labour costs? 
yes 
No    → GO TO QUESTION 21
Don’t know    → GO TO QUESTION 21
20 − NON-cORE if “yes”, why?
Please choose a single option, the most important reason.
Competition has become more intense 
More workers are available on the market 
Trade unions have less power in collective bargaining 
Employment protection has become less tight 
Production is outsourced in markets where labour is cheaper 
Price inflation and inflation expectations are lower and more stable 
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The next six questions investigate how your firm adjusts wages, prices, total costs, employment and margins to shocks.  
in answering, for prices please refer to the “main product or service, defined as the one that generated the highest fraction  
of turnover in the “reference year”, and for employment and wages please refer to the main occupational group in your firm  
(as identified in question 1)
21 − How relevant are each one of the following strategies when your firm faces an unanticipated slowdown in demand?
Please tick an option for each line.
not 
relevant
of little 
relevance
relevant
very 
relevant
don’t 
know 
Reduce prices     
Reduce margins     
Reduce output     
Reduce costs     
22 − if the reduction of costs is of any relevance in your answer to question 21, please indicate the main channel through which 
this goal is achieved: 
Please choose a single option, the most important factor.
Reduce base wages 
Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits, etc.) 
Reduce the number of permanent employees 
Reduce the number of temporary employees / other type of workers 
Adjust the number of hours worked per employee 
Reduce non-labour costs 
23 − How relevant are each one of the following strategies when your firm faces an unanticipated increase in the cost of an 
intermediate input (e.g. an oil price increase) affecting all firms in the market?
Please tick an option for each line.
not 
relevant
of little 
relevance
relevant
very 
relevant
don’t 
know 
Increase prices     
Reduce margins     
Reduce output     
Reduce other costs     
24 − if the reduction of other costs is of any relevance in your answer to question 23, please indicate the main channel through 
which this goal is achieved: 
Please choose a single option, the most important factor.
Reduce base wages 
Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits, etc ) 
Reduce the number of permanent employees 
Reduce the number of temporary employees / other type of workers 
Adjust the number of hours worked per employee 
Reduce other non-labour costs 
25 − How relevant are each one of the following strategies when your firm faces an unanticipated permanent increase in wages 
(e.g. due to the renewal of the national contract) affecting all firms in the market?
Please tick an option for each line.
not 
relevant
of little 
relevance
relevant
very 
relevant
don’t 
know 
Increase prices     
Reduce margins     
Reduce output     
Reduce other costs     
26 − if the reduction of other costs is of any relevance in your answer to question 25, please indicate the main channel through 
which this goal is achieved: 
Please choose a single option, the most important factor.
Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits, etc) 
Reduce the number of permanent employees 
Reduce the number of temporary employees / other type of workers 
Adjust the number of hours worked per employee 
Reduce non-labour costs 
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Price setting and price changes
This section collects information on price setting and the frequency of price changes. 
if your firm produces (or sells) more than a single good or service, the answers must refer to the “main product (or service”, 
defined as the one that generated the highest fraction of your firm’s revenue in the “reference year”. For instance, if your firm 
produces (or sells) several types of hats and shoes, by “product” we mean “hats” and “shoes” (irrespective of the specific type), 
whereas by “main product” we mean the one that generated the highest revenue in the “reference year”.
27 − What share of the revenue generated by your firm’s main product in the reference period was due to sales in:
Domestic market ____%
Foreign markets ____%
Total (= 100%) 100 %
28 − How is the price of your firm’s main product set in its main market?
Please choose a single option.
There is no autonomous price setting policy because:
 − the price is regulated, or is set by a parent company / group 
 − the price is set by the main customer(s) 
The price is set following the main competitors 
The price is set fully according to costs and a completely self-determined profit margin 
Other (please specify) ___________________________________________________ 
29 − NON-cORE To what extent does your firm experience price competition for its main product?
Please choose a single one option.
Severe competition 
Strong competition 
Weak competition 
No competition 
Don’t know / no answer 
30 − Suppose that the main competitor for your firm’s main product decreases its prices; how likely is your firm to react by 
decreasing its own price?
Please choose a single option.
Very likely 
Likely 
Not likely 
Not at all 
It doesn’t apply 
31 − under normal circumstances, how often is the price of the firm’s main product typically changed?
Please choose a single option, the one that best describes the situation in your firm
More than once a year:
 − daily 
 − weekly 
 − monthly 
 − quarterly 
 − half-yearly 
Once a year 
Once every two years 
Less frequently than once every two years 
Never 
There is not a defined pattern 
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information about the firm
34 − How many workers (including employees and other types of workers) did your firm have at the end of the reference period?
Definition of employees is provided in the Appendix. Other definitions: 
Permanent full-time − those who have no set termination date, and whose regular working hours are the same as the collectively 
agreed or customarily worked. 
Permanent part-time − those who have no set termination date, whose working hours are less than those specified for permanent 
full-time. 
Temporary − those who have a set termination date or a specific period of employment. 
Number of employees:   _______________
of which: 
(fill in one of the two columns, as you prefer: levels or %)
Percentages Number
permanent full-time _____ % _______________
permanent part-time _____ % _______________
temporary _____ % _______________
TOTAL ( = 100%) 100 %
Number of other types of workers (e.g. people employed by 
agencies, freelance, consultants, apprenticeships, students, other 
casual workers, etc.)
Number
_______________
35 − How many employees left the firm during the reference period?
Please refer to all types of employees: temporary and permanent, see definition in question 34.
_______________
36 − How many employees joined the firm during the reference period?
Please refer to all types of employees: temporary and permanent, see definition in question 34.
_______________
37 − NON-cORE How were your firm’s employees distributed across the following age classes at the end of the reference period?
Less than 24 years old _____ %
24-54 years old _____ %
55-65 years old _____ %
>65 years old _____ %
TOTAL ( = 100%) 100 %
38 − NON-cORE How were your firm’s permanent employees distributed according to tenure at the end of the reference period?
Less than 1 year _____ %
Between 1 and 5 years _____ %
More than 5 years _____ %
TOTAL ( = 100%) 100 %
39 − NON-cORE According to the current business register, what was the first year of operation of your firm? 
Definitions needed here (see appendix and discuss).
_______________
40 − What percentage of your firm’s total costs were due to labour costs in the reference period?
Definitions: 
Total costs − all operating expenses. 
Labour costs − wages, salaries, bonuses, social contributions, training, tax contributions, contributions to pension funds.
_______ %
APPENDIx 2 − THE WDN SURVEy QUESTIONNAIRE
32 − under normal circumstances, are these price changes concentrated in any particular month / months?
No        
yes:     Jan.       Feb.      Mar.      Apr.      May      June      July      Aug.      Sept.      Oct.      Nov.      Dec. 
33 − How does the timing of these price changes relate to that of wage changes?
Please choose a single option
There is no link between the two 
There is a link but no particular pattern 
Decisions are taken simultaneously 
Price changes tend to follow wage changes 
Wage changes tend to follow price changes 
Don’t know 
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41 − How was your firm’s revenue in the reference period compared to the previous year?
Much lower 
Lower 
Approximately the same 
Higher 
Much higher 
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The frequencies reported in Section 2 allow identifying the duration of prices (for the firm’s main product) and wages 
(for the firm’s typical worker) with the help of some additional assumptions. In the context of the survey, price and wage 
duration can be interpreted as the time interval for which these variables remain unchanged. The information collected 
by the survey of frequency of price and wage changes comes in categories, which identify points (e.g. annual changes 
correspond to 12 months duration) and intervals on the support of the duration distribution. While points translate directly 
into durations, we need a distributional assumption in order to impute an expected duration to each interval. Three such 
intervals need this assumption: a) expected wage duration if it is shorter than one year (frequency more than once a year); 
b) expected wage duration if it is longer than two years (frequency less than once every two years); c) expected price 
duration if it is longer than one year (frequency less than yearly). 
We assume a lognormal distribution for both wage and price durations. Note that the support of the lognormal is the 
positive real line appropriate for durations, and the shape of the histogram of point answers is close to the shape of 
a lognormal density function both for wages and prices. The distributional assumption is necessarily ad-hoc but it is 
consistent with a positive support of durations. At the same time, the reported large mass of probability at specific points 
(e.g. once a year that translates into 12 months exactly) is at odds with the lognormal or any other continuous distribution. 
With these caveats in mind, one should think of the duration results as being an approximation.
We define durations in months. Let dw denote the duration of wages and dp that of prices. As already mentioned, the three 
durations that need to be imputed are the following:
E[dw|dw<12]: expected duration for wages if duration shorter than one year;
E[dw|dw>24]: expected duration for wages if duration longer than two years;
E[dp|dp>12]: expected duration for prices if duration longer than one year.
The information that we use the computation of expected wage duration is that on the changes that identify various points. 
We denote these points, that will serve as thresholds in the exercise, τwj:
τw1= more than once a year, 
τw2= once a year, 
τw3= once every two years, 
τw4= less frequently than once every two years.
 These thresholds imply the following probabilities of duration intervals:
P(dw≤11) = P(τw1)
P(dw≤12) = P(τw1)+ P(τw2)
Appendix 3 − computing expected 
durations
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P(dw≤24) = P(τw1)+ P(τw2)+P(τw3)
P(dw>24) = P(τw4) (this last one is redundant)
The analogous data for price duration with thresholds τpi are the following:
24 
τp1=daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly,
τp2=half-yearly/twice a year, 
τp3=once a year, 
τp4= less frequently than once a year.
Implied probabilities of duration intervals (dp)
P(dp≤4) = P(τp1)
P(dp≤6) = P(τp1)+ P(τp2)
P(dp≤12) = P(τp1)+ P(τp2)+P(τp3)
P(dp>12) = P(τp4) (this last one is redundant)
The first step is to estimate the parameters of the unconditional distributions. We assume lognormality so that the natural 
log of durations (denoted as ld) is normally distributed:
ldj=log(dj) ~ N(μj,σj), j=p,w. 
Then
P(dj≤a) = P(ldj≤log(a)) = P[(ldj−μj)/σj ≤ (log(a)−μj)/σj] = Φ[(log(a)−μj)/σj]
where is the standard normal c.d.f. Take inverse of normal c.d.f. of two sides to get
Φ−1[P(dj≤a)] = (log(a)−μj)/σj
For prices, we have four such equations, for wages, three. Both are overidentified: two equations would identify μj, σj. 
A minimum distance or least squares approach (if unweighted) is numerically equivalent to taking all possible exactly 
identified estimates and take their average. Exactly identified solutions are the following:
Φ−1[P(d≤a)] = (log(a)−μ)/σ and  Φ−1[P(d≤b)] = (log(b)−μ)/σ
σ = (log(a)−μ)/ Φ−1[P(d≤a)]
and therefore 
Φ−1[P(d≤b)] = (log(b)−μ)Φ−1[P(d≤a)]/(log(a)−μ)
24  For the imputation exercise, we collapsed the four high-frequency categories into one, for simplicity and in order to get identification from the 
upper-duration (low-frequency) part of the distribution − latter makes sense because here it is only the upper duration point that we want to impute. 
Note that it is only for the imputation exercise that we collapsed the shorter-duration categories E[dp|dp>12], and no information was discarded for 
the eventual translation of frequencies into durations.
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APPENDIx 3 − COMPUTING ExPECTED DURATIONS
so that 
μ = [log(b)−log(a)B/A]/[1−B/A] where A= Φ−1[P(d≤a)] and B= Φ−1[P(d≤b)] 
Data from the survey answers define fractions of firms that are estimates of each probability interval defined above [i.e. 
P(τp1)+ P(τp2)]. We use employment weights and discard missing answers for estimating these fractions. The unconditional 
parameters are estimated to be the following:
for price duration: μ=2.0, σ=0.6
for wage duration: μ=2.4, σ=0.4
Given these unconditional parameters of the lognormal distribution, we computed the conditional expectations by 
simulation and we find that these imputed conditional expectations are: 
E[dw|dw<12] = 8.3, E[dw|dw>24] = 27.4 and E[dp |dp>12] = 17.7
mnb occasional papers 102. • 201244
The tables below show average partial effects evaluated at sample means. Such effects measure discrete changes in the 
probability of each outcome as the covariate increases by dx in the case of a continuous variable and by a unit 1 in the case 
of dummies or count variables.
Appendix 4 − The frequency of price 
and wage changes: marginal effects
Table A4.1
Frequency of price changes: marginal effects
(col. 5 in Table 8)
prob. of changing 
price daily/monthly
prob. of changing 
price quarterly/twice 
a year
prob. of changing 
price yearly
prob. of changing 
price less frequently 
than yearly
Construction  0.013**  0.032**  0.061** −0.106**
Trade  0.025**  0.070**  0.173** −0.268**
Market services   0.000  0.001  0.001 −0.002
Financial intermediation  0.021**  0.061**  0.184** −0.266**
Firm size 20-49  0.001  0.002  0.003 −0.006
Firm size 50-199  0.007**  0.015**  0.020* −0.042*
Firm size > 200  0.009**  0.020**  0.029** −0.058**
AT  0.001  0.002  0.002 −0.005
BE  0.012  0.029  0.055 −0.095
CZ  0.000  0.001  0.001 −0.002
ES  0.004  0.009  0.012 −0.025
FR  0.004  0.009  0.012 −0.024
GR  0.011**  0.025**  0.039* −0.075**
IE −0.003 −0.007 −0.008  0.019
IT  0.012**  0.028**  0.050* −0.090*
LT  0.005  0.011  0.017 −0.033
NL  0.020**  0.057**  0.162** −0.240**
PL  0.010**  0.025**  0.041* −0.076*
PT  0.008*  0.018*  0.029 −0.055*
SI  0.008*  0.019*  0.029* −0.056*
Labour cost share −0.023** −0.050** −0.063**  0.136**
Competitive pressures  0.017**  0.038**  0.045** −0.100**
Export (% of sales)  0.006*  0.012*  0.016* −0.034
Share of white collars −0.009** −0.020** −0.025**  0.054**
Share of high skilled workers −0.004* −0.009* −0.011*  0.024*
Share of full time permanent workers −0.001 −0.003 −0.004  0.008
Workforce turnover  0.009**  0.019**  0.024** −0.052
Share of bonuses on total wage bill −0.001 −0.002 −0.003  0.006
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
mnb occasional papers 102. • 2012 45
APPENDIx 4 − THE FREQUENCy OF PRICE AND WAGE CHANGES: MARGINAL EFFECTS
Table A4.2
Frequency of wage changes: marginal effects
(col. 7 in Table 9)
prob. of changing wages 
more frequently than yearly
prob. of changing wages
yearly
prob. of changing wages less 
frequently than yearly
Construction  0.026**  0.034* −0.060**
Trade −0.015* −0.013**  0.028*
Market services  −0.017** −0.015**  0.032**
Financial intermediation −0.037* −0.022**  0.059**
Firm size 20-49  0.013*  0.014* −0.027*
Firm size 50-199  0.027**  0.030** −0.057**
Firm size > 200  0.038**  0.050** −0.089**
AT  0.015  0.017 −0.031
BE −0.015 −0.012  0.026
CZ −0.099** −0.022**  0.121**
ES  0.028**  0.039* −0.068*
FR  0.047**  0.067** −0.114**
GR  0.055**  0.088** −0.143**
IE −0.038** −0.025**  0.063**
LT −0.298**  0.096**  0.202**
NL  0.072**  0.195** −0.267**
PL  0.015  0.016 −0.031
PT −0.032* −0.021**  0.054**
Labour cost share −0.004 −0.003  0.007
Competitive pressures −0.002 −0.002  0.003
Export (% of sales)  0.003  0.003 −0.006
Workforce turnover  0.023**  0.022** −0.045**
Share of bonuses on total wage bill  0.023**  0.019** −0.042**
Collective agreement outside the firm  0.006  0.006 −0.013
Collective agreement at the firm level  0.012*  0.012* −0.024*
Coverage of collective agreement −0.013* −0.012*  0.025*
EPL −0.018** −0.017**  0.035**
Internal policy adjusting wages to prices  0.051**  0.058** −0.109**
Notes: (*) and (**) denote statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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